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Abstract
We study the impact of both microeconomic factors and the macro-
economy on the ¯nancial distress of Chinese listed companies over a
period of massive economic transition, 1995 to 2006. Based on an
economic model of ¯nancial distress under the institutional setting of
state protection against exit, and using our own ¯rm-level measure
of distress, we ¯nd important impacts of ¯rm characteristics, macro-
economic instability and institutional factors on the hazard rate of
¯nancial distress. The results are robust to unobserved heterogeneity
at the ¯rm level, as well as those shared by ¯rms in similar macroeco-
nomic founding conditions. Comparison with related studies for other
economies highlights important policy implications.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we investigate the impact of microeconomic factors and macro-
economic conditions, as well as institutional in°uences, on ¯nancial distress
of Chinese listed ¯rms. Using hazard regression analysis, we ¯nd substantial
e®ect of ¯rm level covariates (age, size, cash °ow and gearing) on ¯nancial
distress, but also a signi¯cant role for macroeconomic stability. Further, there
are important institutional e®ects where, holding other factors constant, the
hazard rate of ¯nancial distress varies with the stock exchange where the
¯rm is listed. However, the e®ect of state ownership is not statistically sig-
ni¯cant. The results are robust to unobserved heterogeneity at the ¯rm level,
as well as those shared by ¯rms in similar macroeconomic founding condi-
tions. Comparison of our results with related studies for western economies
highlight several important policy implications.
Following Chan and Chen (1991), ¯nancially distressed ¯rms \have lost
market value because of poor performance, they are ine±cient producers,
and they are likely to have high ¯nancial leverage and cash °ow problems.
They are marginal in the sense that their prices tend to be more sensitive to
changes in the economy, and they are less likely to survive adverse economic
conditions." Therefore, investors demand a premium for holding such risky
stocks and expect to be rewarded for bearing the risk.
Typically, ¯nancial distress of the above nature is measured by the prob-
ability of failure (Altman, 1993; Shumway, 2001). However, despite being
¯nancially distressed many ¯rms do not exit. In the US, distressed ¯rms
often ¯le for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 or Chapter 11, or de-list for perfor-
mance related reasons, without necessarily going out of business (Campbell
et al., 2008). One of the reasons is the protectionist stance of bankruptcy
codes (Bhattacharjee et al., 2009a). Likewise, business exits in our data on
Chinese quoted ¯rms are vanishingly rare, arguably because of active state
protection for the failing ¯rm.
The divergence between exits and ¯nancial distress is closely related to
the distinction between ¯xed and sunk costs. While both sunk costs and
¯xed costs are independent of ¯rm output, they have di®erent implications
for ¯rm exits (Owen and Ulph, 2002). Fixed costs relate to assets that
are valuable to other ¯rms, and therefore can be traded in the secondary
market. By contrast, sunk costs involve assets that are valuable solely to
the ¯rm that creates them and unlike ¯xed costs, entail exit costs. Thus, an
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incumbent ¯rm exits only if its operating pro¯t covers the ¯xed costs, but
not necessarily its sunk costs plus ¯xed costs; in the latter case, it will be
¯nancially distressed.
Measurement of ¯nancial distress must recognise the above distinction
with failure. In this paper, we construct our own indicator for ¯nancial dis-
tress at the ¯rm level. This indicator measures the degree to which operating
pro¯ts cover the ¯nancial costs of the ¯rm, the total of debt obligations relat-
ing to ¯rm-speci¯c assets (sunk costs) and other capital assets (¯xed costs),
controlling for the possibility that some ¯rms may undergo rapid expansion
by accumulating debt. Against the institutional setting of active state pro-
tection, we develop a simple economic model of ¯nancial distress, where ¯rms
receive protection in the form of a guaranteed threshold return on their cap-
ital. Finally, we use our measure to study macroeconomic, microeconomic
and institutional in°uences on ¯rm turnover.
This paper makes several important contributions. First, we develop a
model of state protection in an economy with high sunk costs and limited
secondary market for acquired capital. Testable implications are veri¯ed us-
ing duration data on ¯nancial distress. Second, given the importance of the
Chinese economy, understanding failure in Chinese industry is important for
investors. Third, while the macroeconomy is a potentially important de-
terminant of ¯nancial distress, the e®ect of macroeconomic conditions and
instability on ¯nancial distress and exit has not been adequately studied in an
emerging market context. Thus, our research is useful for credit risk measure-
ment and management for China, and for emerging economies more generally.
Fourth, our research quanti¯es the e®ect of institutional factors, which are
expected to be important against the backdrop of massive economic transi-
tion experienced in China. Last but not the least, the current study provides
a basis for comparison with related research for advanced economies. In par-
ticular, our comparative analysis provides valuable insights into regulatory
reform and development of institutions in a transition economy context.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and
discusses the institutional background, while the data and variable construc-
tion are described in Section 3. Section 4 discusses our economic model of
¯nancial distress and the empirical framework for our analysis. We discuss
the estimated hazard regression models in Section 5, focussing on compari-
son with related studies for advanced economies and implications for policy.
Finally, Section 6 concludes.
3
2 Literature and Institutional Backdrop
2.1 Firm-level factors and industry
There is a large theoretical and empirical microeconomic literature pointing
to the importance of ¯rm- and industry-speci¯c factors on ¯nancial distress,
defaults and exits; see Siegfried and Evans (1994) and Caves (1998) for re-
views. Indeed, current theories of industrial organisation (Ericson and Pakes,
1995; Jovanovic, 1982; Hopenhayn, 1992) predict that exit rates may decline
with ¯rm age and size. Consistent with the above theoretical models of
¯rm-level learning, the credit scoring literature has highlighted ¯nancial ra-
tios including leverage, cash °ow, and pro¯tability, in addition to ¯rm age,
size and industry, as determinants of failure, with binary response models
providing the basis for probability scores of company failure (Ta²er, 1982;
Cuthbertson and Hudson, 1996; Lennox, 1999). Similarly, current theories
and empirics of industrial organization highlights the importance of industry
conditions; see, for example, Dunne et al. (1988), Audretsch (1995), Baldwin
(1995) and Caves (1998).
2.2 Macroeconomic conditions and instability
At the same time as microeconomic factors are important, ¯rm defaults
increase dramatically during economic downturns (Fama, 1986; Carty and
Fons, 1993; Koopman and Lucas, 2005). More generally, macroeconomic
conditions have good explanatory power for corporate defaults and are use-
ful in modeling credit risk; see, for example, Nickell et al. (2000), Bangia
et al. (2002), Allen and Saunders (2003) and Carling et al. (2004). Default
can be triggered either because the idiosyncratic shock has reached the de-
fault threshold in a given regime or because of a change in the value of the
aggregate shock. The second type provides a rationale for clustering of exit
decisions observed in many markets (Hackbarth et al., 2006).
The economic cycle (and in particular, macroeconomic indicators such
as interest rate, unemployment rate and retail sales) has been found to af-
fect pro¯tability, gearing, cash °ow and thereby in°uence company failures
(Everett and Watson, 1998; Hackbarth et al., 2006). Firm exits through com-
pulsory liquidation increase during periods of severe downturn in the aggre-
gate economy (Caballero and Hammour, 1994), particularly if the downturn
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is driven by demand shocks. Variations in the macroeconomic environment
signi¯cantly a®ect the ¯nancial performance of ¯rms as well (Machin and
van Reenen, 1993; Higson et al., 2002, 2004).
Young (1995) examines the e®ect of changes in interest rates on insolven-
cies, and ¯nds that companies are vulnerable to unanticipated changes in real
interest rates; see also Wadhwani (1986). Similarly, Goudie and Meeks (1991)
simulate the ¯nancial statements of UK ¯rms, contingent on macroeconomic
conditions, and observe signi¯cant asymmetric and non-linear impact of the
exchange rate upon failure rates. Koopman and Lucas (2005) provide further
empirical evidence of a link between business cycles and default at the ¯rm
level, while Ferri et al. (2001) report cyclical behaviour of ratings agencies.
In addition to aggregate macroeconomic conditions, instability also plays
an important role. Lenders are often less willing to lend when there is higher
instability (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1990), increasing credit constraints on
¯rms and leading some ¯rms to ¯nancial distress. Further, in the presence
of credit constraints, the e®ect of uncertainty on business performance may
be asymmetric (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997).
Bhattacharjee et al. (2009a,b) examine ¯rm exits through bankruptcies and
acquisitions, for listed ¯rms in the UK and the US, and ¯nd that both modes
of exit depend on the macroeconomic environment, particularly, macroeco-
nomic instability. At the same time, legal institutions can reduce the devas-
tating e®ects of a large negative shock (Bhattacharjee et al., 2009a).
2.3 Unobserved factors
The empirical literature on ¯rm dynamics has generally acknowledged the
importance of unobserved heterogeneity in understanding ¯rm exits. In the
US shipbuilding industry, Thompson (2005) ¯nds an important role for un-
observed variation in initial experience. Bhattacharjee et al. (2006) study
the role of unobserved human capital in entrepreneurial choice and its impact
on the survival of newly created ¯rms. Other important factors discussed in
the literature include intangibles and R&D investments, often unobserved in
emerging economies.
It is therefore important to recognise the role of unobserved heterogeneity
on the ¯nancial fragility of ¯rms. Such heterogeneity in the founding condi-
tions of ¯rms may be related both to entrepreneurial human capital and to
macroeconomic conditions at the time of incorporation.
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2.4 Institutional backdrop
Over the past 30 years, the Chinese economy has been going through complex
transformation from a centrally planned towards a market economy. The
liberalisation of the macroeconomy has played an important part in this
transformation. This is in addition to industrial reforms, particularly for
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), as well as changes in the legal framework.
These developments are important for understanding ¯nancial distress and
survival of ¯rms in Chinese industry. While the pace of reforms has been
gentle, it has been argued that the gradualist approach of retaining policies
and institutional arrangements that are supposed to be highly inimical to
economic activity1 have worked to the bene¯t of Chinese industry (Rodrik,
2006); see also Blanchard and Kremer (1997), Roland and Verdier (1999)
and Qian (2003).
In 1996, current account convertibility in the Yuan Renminbi (RMB)
was initiated, but the capital account is still under restricted control. The
foreign exchange market has therefore remained relatively underdeveloped,
especially the derivatives market. This has potentially undermined the ability
of Chinese companies to guard against exchange rate shocks. Further, the
undervalued and relatively ¯xed exchange rate regime has encouraged import
substitution. The Chinese economy has, therefore, become more dependent
on exports and the industry more vulnerable to °uctuations in the external
sector (Aziz and Li, 2007). At the same time, export performance of Chinese
industry has been consistently robust, pointing to a remarkable capability to
mitigate against adverse shocks in the external sector.
Similarly, while real interest rates have been relatively volatile, the likely
impact of resulting instability on Chinese companies is by no means clear.
For one, Chinese industry appears to have had substantial state protec-
tion against interest rate shocks, particularly the SOEs (Goodhart and Xu,
1996).2 Also, it has been argued that nonperforming loans, borrowing con-
straints, and uncertainty in regulations relating to bank lending have pro-
moted large transfers from households to ¯rms, keeping cost of capital low
1For example, absence of private property rights, state trading, substantial public own-
ership and high barriers to trade.
2Sometimes, state protection is rather explicit. Over the period 1998-2001, Chinese
SOEs were shielded against increasing interest rates by debt-equity swaps and discounts
in lending rates.
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and encouraging investment (Aziz, 2008). On the other hand, a very high
debt rate and predominance of borrowing under °oating interest rates may
render Chinese industry particularly susceptible to volatility in interest rates.
Further, entry of foreign banks and increased competition in the banking sec-
tor has made ¯nancial resources more concentrated on the big state-owned
companies while increasing credit constraints on small enterprises.3
Important reforms were also instituted in the SOE sector (Zhang, 2004).
Since 1994, the state has maintained a policy whereby large SOEs are more
actively protected at the cost of smaller ones. Also, a disconnect between
ownership and control has been actively promoted for SOEs. Nevertheless,
substantial agency problems exist, in addition to problems due to political
controls (Zhang, 2004).
Protection of creditor rights as well as general legal infrastructure has
been lacking in the Chinese economy, and this may have important implica-
tions for ¯nancial distress and business failure. The important role of legisla-
tion in cross-country di®erences in ¯rm exits has been noted in the literature
(Brouwer, 2006; Bhattacharjee et al., 2009a). The Chinese bankruptcy code,
¯rst introduced for SOEs in 1986, was gradually extended to other collective
and private ¯rms (Harmer, 1996; Falke, 2007). A more extensive law gov-
erning bankruptcy and reorganisations for all enterprises has recently been
introduced. A di®erent bankruptcy system was introduced in 1994, aimed
mainly at regulating mergers, restructuring and bankruptcy of state-owned
¯rms in key industries. The mechanism is entirely state controlled, including
periodic selection of key industries and speci¯c ¯rms, as well as ¯rm spe-
ci¯c bankruptcy procedures. The workers laid o® from such selected ¯rms
are o®ered ¯rst preference to the proceeds from the sell-out of these ¯rms
in preference to the debtors; as a result, they obtain much higher compen-
sation than similar workers laid o® through the standard bankruptcy code.
These idiosyncratic and selective aspects of state protection of Chinese ¯rms
in bankruptcty have potentially important implications for our study. This
is particularly relevant against the ¯nding in Guariglia and Poncet (2008)
that ¯nancial distortions introduced by state interventions in China is an
important impediment to economic growth and development.
3According to a 2002 World Bank study, 80 percent of Chinese companies reported
problems in obtaining capital (Huang and Khanna, 2003).
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3 Data
Our empirical analysis uses ¯nancial data on Chinese quoted ¯rms extracted
from Bureau van Dijk's Osiris database.4 We include the 1 609 non¯nan-
cial ¯rms listed at any time over the period under study { 1995 to 2006.5
Compared with other datasets, the above data are unique in that they o®er
complete coverage of listed Chinese ¯rms (and therefore do not su®er from
potential selection biases), and contain information on ownership and exits,
in addition to ¯nancial accounting variables. Admittedly, the incidence of
exits and ¯nancial distress would be higher if we were to include private
unlisted ¯rms. However, in line with the literature (Campbell et al., 2008;
Bhattacharjee et al., 2009a,b), we focus on listed ¯rms for which ¯nancial
distress has important implications for price premiums on stocks.
Notably, only 7 ¯rm exits are recorded in the Osiris database.6 At the
same time, there are many ¯rms which have survived periods of vanishingly
low interest cover, concurrently with substantial depletion in both ¯xed assets
and share capital. Note that, a reduction in ¯xed assets is not necessarily
associated with distress, especially in the Chinese context where some ¯rms
have tended to overinvest in the past, and have undergone restructuring
more recently. However, such restructuring would typically be associated
with reduced debt obligations. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that a sharp
fall in assets will be concurrent with decline in interest cover, particularly
if the ¯rm also experienced fall in share capital at the same time. It may
be presumed that such ¯rms su®ered from immense ¯nancial distress, and
4Bureau Van Dijk's Osiris database (van Dijk, 2003) provides ¯nancial accounts for
the world's publicly quoted companies (more than 24 000).
5Listed in either of the three stock exchanges { Shanghai, Shenzhen or Hong Kong,
or in a foreign exchange. There are ¯ve categories of shares issued by listed Chinese
companies { A, B, H, N and S shares. While A shares are issued in the domestic markets
(Shanghai and Shenzhen) and traded in Chinese currency (RMB), B shares are stocks
in the domestic market that are traded in foreign currencies. H shares, N shares and S
shares refer to Chinese ¯rms listed in Hongkong, New York and Singapore stock exchanges
respectively. Our data comprises all of these categories, as well as companies whose stocks
are listed in the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
6According to o±cial sources, 48 companies were delisted (51 stocks) from the domestic
exchanges (Shanghai and Shenzhen) between 1990 and 2006. This, too, is a very small
number compared to the size of the quoted population.
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were saved from liquidation only through substantial state protection. We,
therefore, base our analysis on a synthetic indicator of ¯nancial distress at
the ¯rm level.
Below we describe our data construction, including our indicator of ¯-
nancial distress, measures of macroeconomic conditions and instability, and
¯rm and industry characteristics.
3.1 Measure of ¯nancial distress
The credit scoring literature has developed a wide range of measures for ¯-
nancial distress, typically used in bankruptcy prediction; see Altman (1993)
and Allen and Saunders (2003) for extensive reviews. In the spirit of Zmijew-
ski (1984) and Shumway (2001), we construct our own indicator for ¯nancial
distress at the ¯rm level.
Traditional distress scores incorporate ratios measuring pro¯tability, liq-
uidity, and solvency. However, given the speci¯c context of Chinese industry,
our construction is based on slightly di®erent parameters. Our measure com-
bines a debt sustainability measure (interest cover) with evidence that assets
and equity in the ¯rm is decreasing. Speci¯cally, we consider the following
three conditions:
² Interest cover  07 (in current or previous year),
² Decline in ¯xed assets (in current or next year), and
² Decrease in share capital (in current and next year).
The base criteria is based on repayment capability, measured by interest
cover. This relates to the notion that ¯nancial distress is associated with
the condition that operating pro¯ts cannot cover the total of ¯xed and sunk
costs. However, a low interest cover can result from capital accumulation
¯nanced by borrowings. In this case, ¯xed assets in the ¯rm should build
up substantially. Similarly, while a low interest cover may result from debt
equity swaps, such retirement of share capital is very unlikely to accompany
simultaneous decline in ¯xed assets. Therefore, we designate a ¯rm as be-
ing ¯nancially distressed in a given year if all the above three conditions
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are satis¯ed.7 Based on this measure, there were 289 instances of ¯nancial
distress in 8 039 ¯rm years over the 12 year period. The incidence of ¯nan-
cial distress shows substantial variation over the period of analysis (Table
1). Based on the above measure, we will estimate a regression model, de-
scribing the hazard rate of ¯nancial distress as a function of macroeconomic,
¯rm-speci¯c and industry factors, after conditioning on age of the ¯rm since
incorporation; see Shumway (2001) for a related approach.
TABLE 1: Financial Distress Incidence
Year Distressed ¯rms Total Incidence rate
1995-96 1 26 385
1997-98 6 77 779
1999 13 334 389
2000 30 726 413
2001 40 939 426
2002 39 1069 365
2003 32 1107 289
2004 49 1246 393
2005 58 1237 469
2006 21 1278 164
In terms of hazard model analysis, our age (duration) data are right-
censored and left-truncated.8 The Bureau van Dijk'sOsiris database includes
data on incorporation years for the included ¯rms. However, these data are
not entirely clean, and display unrealistic lumping of entries in certain years.
We veri¯ed and corrected the incorporation years for our sample companies
from other sources { stock exchanges and company annual reports.
7Admittedly, the cut-o® for interest cover, as well as choice of periods is somewhat
subjective. Therefore, we verify that our ¯ndings are robust to alternate constructions of
the synthetic measure. Speci¯cally, we consider alternative cut-o®s at 05 and 10, and
three year windows centred on the current year. Our empirical results are robust to these
investigations.
8For each company included in our sample, the data used pertain to years, since 1995,
during which the company is listed in either of Shanghai, Shenzen, Hong Kong or foreign
stock exchanges. Hence, for each company, the available data are left-truncated, and do
not pertain to the entire period that it is listed.
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3.2 Macroeconomic conditions and instability
We use the following empirical proxies for macroeconomic conditions:
² As a measure of the business cycle we use an index, the so-called \con-
sistent macro index" published by the Chinese National Bureau of Sta-
tistics. The index is derived from consistent indicators whose peak
and trough approximately coincide with that of per capita output at
business cycle frequencies. This measure is easily computed and reg-
ularly published, and provides a reliable snapshot of the overall state
of the economy. The index of industrial production, number of indus-
trial employees, growth rate of completed investment in ¯xed assets,
total retail sales of consumer goods, total customs duties on imports
and exports, revenue and total pro¯ts of industrial enterprises, and the
disposable income of urban residents are the indicators included in the
above index.
² Real interest rates are measured as the benchmark rate on 3-5 year
RMB loans for ¯nancial institutions (published by the People's Bank
of China),9 minus the annual rate of in°ation.
² US business cycle, our proxy for export demand, is measured by the
Hodrick-Presscott ¯ltered series of quarterly US GDP per capita aver-
aged over the four quarters of each year.
Figures 1 plots the annual incidence of ¯nancial distress and the business
cycle indicator for the year. Incidence is measured as the proportion (per-
centage) of ¯rms that were ¯nancially distressed (for the ¯rst time) that year
to the total number of listed companies. As expected, quoted ¯rm ¯nan-
cial distress is generally countercyclical, being higher in recessions and lower
during upturns of the business cycle. However, the relationship between the
two must be conditioned on other factors, both microeconomic and macro-
economic, that are potentially important. Therefore, we also include in our
analysis real interest rates as well as measures of macroeconomic instability.10
Bhattacharjee et al. (2009a,b) report an important role of macroeconomic
stability on the survival of quoted UK and US ¯rms, in addition to ¯rm and
9Interest rates on commercial loans are directly linked to the benchmark rate. Between
1999 and 2003, lenders are allowed to set interest rates within a band between 07 to 13
times the benchmark rate of interest; the range was widened to 09 times to 17 times in
11
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Figure 1: Business Cycle and Distress Incidence
industry factors. It has been argued in the literature that macroeconomic
instability may have adverse e®ects on the performance of ¯rms.
Further, the impact of such uncertainty is asymmetric. For example, in
economies with credit constraints, credit imperfections generate a transmis-
sion mechanism through which a small, temporary shock can generate large,
persistent domestic balance sheet e®ects. This feature has motivated ¯nan-
cial accelerator-type models (Bernanke et al., 1996), including the borrowing
constraint in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), costly state veri¯cation in Bernanke
and Gertler (1989) and sudden stops in Calvo (2000). The ampli¯cation e®ect
can explain why a small fundamental problem can evolve into a large-scale
deterioration of economic performance. The credit constraint interacts with
aggregate economic activity over the business cycle and generates asymmet-
ric e®ects in response to unexpected productivity shocks.11 There is related
January 2004, and the upper limit was withdrawn in October 2004.
10See also Koopman and Lucas (2005), Hackbarth et al. (2006) and Bhattacharjee et
al. (2009a,b).
11While a positive shock has only a small e®ect, a negative shock (even if temporary) can
reduce the value of the ¯rm to a discounted liquidation value. Since the liquidated assets
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empirical work on mechanisms which create asymmetric volatility responses
(Engle and Ng, 1993); see Bhattacharjee et al. (2009b) for further discussion.
Traditional measures of instability, for example those based on standard
deviations, are not able to capture such asymmetric e®ects. We use signed
gradients in monthly measures of macroeconomic indicators to identify sharp
changes. We use the following measures of macroeconomic instability:
² We measure interest rate instability by standard deviation of e®ective
interest rates (interest payments divided by total borrowings) across the
cross-section of ¯rms in each year, signed by annual ¯rst di®erences of
the cross-section median. Bhattacharjee et al. (2009a,b) use, as their
measure of interest rate instability, the annual ¯rst di®erences of aver-
age short term real interest rates prevailing during each year. While
benchmark interest rates in China show substantial volatility over the
period of analysis, there are long periods over which there is little vari-
ation in this measure. At the same time, cross-section variation in
e®ective interest rates is substantial, indicating that credit available
to ¯rms are charged at variable interest rates. Our measure captures
this variation, as well as potential asymmetric e®ects of interest rate
instability.
² Instability in exchange rate is measured by the largest month-to-month
rate of variation within the calendar year, based on monthly average
real e®ective exchange rates (published by the Bank for International
Settlements).
3.3 Firm-level and industry-level characteristics
We include a number of variables characterising the ¯rm and its ¯nancial
performance, and dummies to capture industry e®ects. Firm-level ¯nancial
ratios are typically strongly collinear with macroeconomic aggregates (Bhat-
tacharjee et al., 2009a,b). This poses an empirical issue, not only because of
potential endogeneity, but also because our economic model presented later
is based on the assumption that ¯rm level e±ciency draws are independent
of macroeconomic shocks. We regress size, cash °ow, pro¯tability and gear-
ing at the ¯rm-level on the macroeconomic variables included in our analysis
cannot be restored when the shock is over, the ampli¯cation e®ect becomes persistent.
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and collect residuals. These residuals, representing \excess" values over what
would be expected for the prevailing macroeconomic conditions are used as
measures of the ¯rm-level factors. These computations are applied to the
following underlying measures of ¯rm conditions.
² Firm size is measured as the logarithm of ¯xed capital in real terms,
incremented by unity. Firm size is often an important determinant
of a ¯rm's competitive ability. Large ¯rms are also likely to have less
¯nancing constraints, which is re°ected in the much higher failure rates
of small ¯rms (Geroski and Gregg, 1996).
² Pro¯tability is measured by gross pro¯t margin, which is calculated as
the ratio of gross pro¯ts to sales. It measures how much out of every
unit of sales a company actually keeps in earnings. Pro¯t margin is
useful when comparing companies in similar industries. A higher pro¯t
margin indicates a more pro¯table company that has better control
over its costs compared to its competitors.
² We measure the ¯rm's ¯nancial structure by its gearing ratio, the ra-
tio of debt to the sum of debt and equity. This measure focuses on
the claims of debt investors and measures the extent to which the ¯rm
funds its capital employed using debt. While ¯nancial leverage usually
increases the returns on equity, it also increases the volatility of earn-
ings. Companies with low gearing ratios are reported to outperform
the market in the long run (Ta²er, 1982; Altman, 1993). A low debt
to equity ratio is an attractive feature for investors as it is indicative of
lower ¯nancial risk and provides the ¯rm with the opportunity to raise
more debt ¯nancing in the future.
² Cash °ow from operations is an important measure of the ¯nancial
health of a ¯rm. Cash rich ¯rms are potentially attractive takeover
targets (Bhattacharjee et al., 2009a,b). However, cash is also a rela-
tively free ¯nancial resource with potential for enhancing agency costs
(Jensen, 1986).12 We include the ratio of cash °ow (CF) to capital
(measured by total assets) in our analyses.
12Theory suggests that cash may be wasted by managers on poor (low NPV) invest-
ments. In the case of Chinese industry, this is particularly important, since prior research
has suggested overinvestment and overcapacity (Felipe et al., 2003), as well as miallocation
of investment into relatively unproductive sectors (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2006).
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² We also include a dummy for state ownership in our model. As dis-
cussed earlier, Chinese state-owned ¯rms and private ¯rms are subject
to di®erent competitive environments, and di®erent ¯nancial and pol-
icy support when they face the same macroeconomic shock. Therefore,
their propensity for ¯nancial distress may be di®erent.
² Dummies for stock exchanges { Shanghai, Shenzen and Hong Kong,
the benchmark being foreign listed ¯rms, are included in our analysis
to capture potential institutional di®erences in corporate control and
governance mechanisms.
² The theory and practice of industrial organisation highlights the role of
industry in ¯rm dynamics, in terms of concentration, capital intensity,
innovation and various related factors. We collect data, from several
external sources, on the industry to which each of our sample ¯rms
belong, and use industry dummies to control for systematic variation
in ¯nancial distress across di®erent industries.
TABLE 2: Sample characteristics of the explanatory variables
Variables N Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
Firm £ Year Level
(Excess) size:
ln(real ¯xed capital + 1) 8 039 ¡00116 1342 ¡7277 6778
(Excess) Cash °ow to Capital 8 039 ¡264-4 0068 ¡0415 0408
(Excess) Gross Margin 8 039 00023 0308 ¡3049 3020
(Excess) Gearing 8 039 158-5 0090 ¡0327 0596
Macroeconomic conditions
Business Cycle 12 98428 276 9373 10193
Real interest rate 12 6687 332 005 1224
US Business Cycle 12 0431 120 ¡114 282
Macroeconomic instability
Instability - Interest rate 12 2534 055 175 405
Instability - Exchange rate 12 0045 010 ¡009 017
The sample characteristics of the ¯rm-level and macroeconomic explana-
tory factors included in our empirical model show substantial variation across
¯rms included in our sample, and over the period under study (Table 2). Fur-
ther, there is also substantial variation in the incidence of ¯nancial distress,
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as well as ¯rm-level explanatory variables, across di®erent categories of own-
ership and stock exchanges (Table 3). Speci¯cally, despite higher median
pro¯tability, foreign ¯rms show a higher incidence of ¯nancial distress. Is
this because of protection potentially o®ered to state ¯rms, or simply an
outcome of lower cash °ow and pro¯tability for some ¯rms? Likewise, there
is also large variation in distress incidence across the stock exchanges. Can
this be explained by variation in the institutional setting related to corpo-
rate governance, holding ¯rm and macroeconomic factors constant? These
are questions that our empirical analysis will address, based on an economic
model developed in the next section.
TABLE 3: Distress and Firm level variables
by Ownership and Stock Exchange
Category Firm- Distress Firm £ Year Level (median)
years Incidence Size CF/Cap. Margin Gearing
Ownership
Private 2 082 00495 7525 00590 00726 0342
State 5 899 00314 8150 00601 00606 0332
Collective 58 00172 7610 00817 00712 0266
Exchange
Foreign 708 00155 7058 00770 00781 0340
Hong Kong 708 00226 9303 00848 00952 0316
Shanghai 3 755 00325 8042 00565 00600 0336
Shenzhen 2 868 00488 7930 00576 00593 0336
4 Model and Econometrics
4.1 Economic model
Our economic model builds on the framework in Jovanovic and Rousseau
(2002) and Bhattacharjee et al. (2009b), but accomodates the main special
feature of Chinese industry highlighted in this paper { that ¯rms are shielded
from exit by active state protection. The low incidence of exits in Chinese
industry points to higher sunk costs relative to ¯xed costs (Owen and Ulph,
2002). This may also imply inadequate secondary markets where the ¯rm can
sell its assets in the event of exit. State protection in the form of an assured
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rate of return on assets, possibly at di®erent rates for state and private ¯rms,
can be viewed as a non-market mechanism to partly address this problem.
Firms receive random e®ciency draws in each period, and in addition are
a®ected by macroeconomic shocks. E±ciency and macroeconomic shocks are
independent of each other, positively autocorrelated and evolve jointly as a
¯rst order Markov process. Our model implies that adverse macroeconomic
conditions, in terms of both the level of macroeconomic aggregates and insta-
bility, lead to more distressed ¯rms, and so too does poor random draws of
¯rm-level e±ciency.13 Further, we acknowledge the potential e®ect of unob-
served heterogeneity in founding conditions and human capital (Thompson,
2005; Bhattacharjee et al., 2006).
At any time, , each ¯rm, , is at risk of ¯nancial distress which depends
both on its level of e±ciency and the macroeconomic conditions. The -th
¯rm's state of technology (or e±ciency) at time  is denoted by  and its
capital by . Firms operate under a AK type production function which
takes the form (). Here () is akin to the output-capital ratio and
depends on ¯rm e±ciency: ()  0. We assume that the dynamics
in  and the economy wide macro-environment variable  jointly follows a
Markov transition process. We further assume that  and  are positively
autocorrelated and independent of each other. Hence,  and  are jointly
Markov, i.e.,
[+1 · ¤ +1 · ¤j =   = ] =  (¤ ¤j )
Evolution of capital occurs through investments 
+1 = (1¡ ) +
where  is the depreciation rate. Internal costs of adjustment, b (), are
homogenous of degree 1 in  and , so that
b () =  b µ1 

¶
= ()
where  =  is investment per unit of capital, and we assume that 
is a di®erentiable, increasing and convex function that is de¯ned only for
nonnegative , with (0) = 0.
13See Figure 1 in Bhattacharjee et al. (2009b).
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Then, pro¯ts are given by
[()¡ ()¡  ¡ ()]
where  denotes the cost of capital and () is the ¯rm speci¯c impact of
economic shocks on pro¯ts. () is increasing and convex in , and (0) = 0.
Firms choose their investment to maximise perpetual pro¯t streams.
In line with evidence that exits are almost non-existent, we assume that
there is some mechanism (like state protection) which guarantees the ¯rms
a certain minimum return on its capital; we denote this lower threshold by 
( ). If the ¯rm is ¯nancially distressed, or in other words the value of its
capital in the next period  (¤ ¤) falls below the required return on capital
(), the residual value of the ¯rm falls to the lower guaranteed threshold, .
Then, given , the market value of the ¯rm per unit of capital under the
optimal investment plan is:
( ) = max
¸0 f()¡ ()¡  ¡ () + (1¡  + )
¤
 ( )g
where

¤
 ( ) =
1

Z Z n
 (
¤
 
¤) 1
h
 (
¤
 
¤) ¸ 
i
+1
h
 (
¤
 
¤)  
io
 (¤ ¤j )
is the expected present value of capital in the next period given the ¯rm's 
and the economy's  today, and  is the discount rate.14
At an interior maxima, the optimal  ¸ 0 satis¯es the FOC

0() =  ¤ ( )¡ 
Now, since  and  are independent and positively autocorrelated, ( )
is increasing in  and decreasing in . For given macroeconomic condition 
and threshold return , we denote by ( ) the threshold level of e±ciency
 at which the ¯rm becomes just ¯nancially distressed:

³
( ) 
´
= 
14Bhattacharjee et al. (2009b) consider a similar model, where in each period a ¯rm
chooses between continuation or selling its capital in the market for acquired capital. Here,
in line with the Chinese institutional setting, there is no exit, but incapacity to service its
debt (or ¯nancial distress) drives the rate of return on the ¯rm's assets to the °oor, .
18
Then, ( ) "  and ( ) # . In other words, there is a larger pool of
distressed ¯rms whenever macroeconomic conditions are unfavourable, and
a smaller pool when the threshold return is higher.
Therefore, testable implications of the the model are: (a) the hazard
rate of ¯nancial distress decreases with , (b) the hazard rate of distress is
higher in adverse macroeconomic conditions, and (c) microeconomic ¯rm-
level factors positively related to ¯rm e±ciency level a®ect the probability
of ¯nancial distress negatively. Further, in line with Bhattacharjee et al.
(2006), there may be a role for unobserved heterogeneity in the form of
founding conditions and unobserved human capital.
4.2 Econometrics
We employ hazard regression models to study the impact of various explana-
tory factors (covariates) on ¯nancial distress of Chinese ¯rms. We allow the
e®ect of age on the hazard rate of distress to be °exible, and include co-
variates (regressors) corresponding to macroeconomic factors as well as ¯rm
and industry characteristics. Unobserved heterogeneity in the form of en-
trepreneural human capital and founding conditions also play a potentially
important role.
4.2.1 Cox proportional hazards model
First, we estimate a Cox proportional hazards (PH) model (Cox, 1972), which
is the corner-stone for regression analysis of duration data. Initially, we do
not allow for unobserved heterogeneity. Consider a sample of size  from the
population of newly created ¯rms. The conditional probability of ¯nancial
distress at duration , given the vector of explanatory variables , is mea-
sured by the hazard rate function (j). For each ¯rm , the data provides
information on its life span  measured in years,
15 the covariates (), and
also an indicator that the ¯rm was not distressed by the end of the period
covered by the study. The latter information may be summarized by de¯ning
a binary variable () describing censoring as follows.
15 is the di®erence between the date of ¯nancial distress and the incorporation year
for the -th ¯rm.
19
 =
(
0 : if ¯rm  was not distressed over the study period 1995-2006
1 : if ¯rm  was ¯nancially distressed at some point of time.
The continuous time Cox proportional hazards model is given by
(j; ) = 0() exp(0) (1)
where 0() is an unspeci¯ed function of  called the baseline hazard function
and  is a vector of the regression coe±cients. Cox (1972, 1975) proposed
estimation based on maximising the partial likelihood function:
 =
Y
=1
26664 exp(
0
)
P
=1
 exp(0)
37775


where  = 1 if  ¸  and  = 0 if   .16 The maximum partial
likelihood estimators b are obtained by maximising the logarithm of the
above partial likelihood function with respect to . Since the distress times
(durations) are grouped into years since entry, there are a substantial number
of ties. These ties are resolved using the popular method proposed by Breslow
(1974). The estimation exercise was carried out using the STATA software.
We estimated two versions of the Cox PH model. In the ¯rst, a full set of
year dummies (¯xed e®ects) were included to capture macroeconomic e®ects.
In the second, we model the macroeconomic e®ects explicitly by including
measures of macroeconomic conditions and instability. These estimates are
reported in the ¯rst two columns of Table 4 respectively.
4.2.2 Discrete time proportional hazards model
Next, we address the discrete (annual) nature of our duration data by con-
sidering a grouped time version of the Cox proportional hazards model, also
16The  's are a convenient method to exclude from the denominator the ¯rms who
have already experienced ¯nancial distress and are thus not part of the risk set. In other
words, the population included in the denominator includes only the ¯rms that had not
been under ¯nancial distress before . For censored ¯rms the duration at distress is not
observed, and therefore they do not contribute to the probability of distress in the partial
likelihood. This is why  = 0 for such individuals.
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called the complementary log-log model or discrete PH model (Cox, 1972;
Prentice and Gloeckler, 1978)
ln [¡ ln f1¡  (;)g] = 0 +  (2)
where the time intervals are indexed by  = 1 2    and  denotes the dis-
crete hazard rate in interval  (assumed constant over the interval). This
discrete proportional hazards model assumes that latent continuous failure
times have a proportional hazards speci¯cation but are grouped into inter-
vals. Extending the typical implementation of this model assuming a con-
stant baseline hazard rate, we capture time variation in the baseline hazard
function across periods by including the duration dummies . In other words,
like the continuous time Cox proportional hazards model, we allow the base-
line hazard function to change with age of the ¯rm. Speci¯cally, we allow
the baseline hazard rate to vary over four time periods corresponding to the
age intervals 0-3 years, 4-8 years, 9-23 years and \more than 23" years. This
model was also estimated using the STATA software, and reported in the
third set of results in Table 4.
4.2.3 Unobserved heterogeneity
As discussed before, there is potentially an important e®ect of unobserved
heterogeneity on the hazard rate of ¯nancial distress. This can be partly
attributed to unobserved factors a®ecting the hazard rate, such as entrepre-
neurial human capital and founding conditions of ¯rms.
We address this issue in two ways. First, we account for macroeconomic
founding conditions by estimating a shared frailty model, where a Gamma
distributed unobserved random factor is shared by all ¯rms incorporated in
the same year. The e®ect of such heterogeneity turns out to be statistically
insigni¯cant, and therefore these results are not reported. Second, we con-
sider the grouped time proportional hazards model (2) and assume Gamma
distributed scalar unobserved random e®ects, ln (), speci¯c to each ¯rm:
ln [¡ ln f1¡  (;  )g] = 0 +  + ln ()   = 1     
ln () »  ()  (3)
where  () denotes the Gamma distribution with unit mean and
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shape parameter .17 While the assumption of Gamma heterogeneity is to
some extent arbitrary, some asymptotic justi¯cation for the choice has been
provided by Abbring and van den Berg (2007). The model is estimated using
the `pgmhaz8' STATA code; see also Jenkins (1995). Estimates of the model
are reported in the ¯nal column of Table 4.
4.2.4 Nonproportional covariate e®ects
The proportional hazards and MPH models (1), (2) and (3) substantially
restrict interdependence between the explanatory variables and duration.
Speci¯cally, the restriction that coe±cients of the regressors are constant
over time may not hold in many situations, or may even be unreasonable
from the point of view of relevant economic theory. In particular, the e®ect
of a covariate on the hazard is often empirically found to be increasing or
decreasing in age (sometimes over the whole covariate space, and sometimes
over a range of the covariate space). This clearly constitutes a violation
of the proportional hazards assumption. Several tests for such violation of
the proportional hazards assumption are available in the literature; see, for
example, Grambsch and Therneau (1994) and Bhattacharjee (2008).
An appealing solution to such violation of proportionality is to allow the
covariate to have di®erent e®ects on the hazard according to the age of the
¯rm. Several such estimators have also been proposed in the literature. In
this paper, we used the histogram-sieve estimators of Murphy and Sen (1991),
which are intuitively appealing and permit useful inference. This method
entails dividing the duration axis into several intervals and including the
covariate interacted with an indicator function corresponding to each interval
as covariates in a modi¯ed hazard regression model; see also Bhattacharjee
(2004) and Bhattacharjee et al. (2009a,b).
5 Results and discussion
The model estimates are reported in Table 4. Overall, the estimates are in
line with a priori expectations, o®ering points of comparison with related
studies for western economies and leading to important policy conclusions.
17This is a special case of the mixed proportional hazards (MPH) model (van den Berg,
2001) with discretely observed durations.
22
5.1 Model estimates
Results in the ¯rst column of Table 4 correspond to the continuous time Cox
PH model including a full set of year dummies, while the second set includes
our measures of macroeconomic conditions and stability in place of the year
¯xed e®ects. The two sets of results are very similar. We prefer the second,
which is both parsimonious and facilitates understanding the e®ect of the
macroeconomy on ¯nancial distress.
TABLE 4: Model Estimates181920
Variables Cox PH Cox PH Disc.PH Disc.MPH
Log Baseline Hazard
{ Duration 1 ¡ ¡ ¡30492
(¡033)
¡20585
(¡171)
+
{ [Duration 2 ¡ Duration 1] ¡ ¡ 62795
(210)
¤ 75144
(193)
+
{ [Duration 3 ¡ Duration 1] ¡ ¡ 63285
(212)
¤ 78029
(200)
¤
{ [Duration 4 ¡ Duration 1] ¡ ¡ 65302
(219)
¤ 81903
(210)
¤
Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES
Ownership
(Base = Private) 0 0 0 0
State ¡00661
(¡048)
¡00796
(¡057)
¡00987
(¡069)
¡02608
(¡102)
Collective ¡15692
(¡099)
¡14892
(¡096)
¡28174
(¡252)
¤ ¡09956
(¡063)
Stock Exchange
(Base = Foreign exchanges) 0 0 0 0
Hong Kong 06442
(152)
07224
(173)
+ 06786
(165)
+ 15143
(226)
¤
Shanghai 04519
(126)
04710
(134)
04154
(117)
07413
(142)
Shenzhen 07066
(194)
+ 07577
(212)
¤ 07356
(208)
¤ 12264
(233)
¤
18-scores in parentheses; ¤¤ , ¤and +{ signi¯cant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
19Durations 1{4 refer to the age intervals 0-3, 4-8, 9-23 and \ 23" years respectively.
20Test for proportionality of hazards is rejected at the 5% level against a monotone
hazard ratio alternative, for the macroeconomic variables interest rate instability and US
business cycle, both for the Cox PH and Discrete PH model speci¯cations. We therefore
allow the e®ect of these variables to vary with age of the ¯rm. For further details on the
methodology, see Bhattacharjee (2008).
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TABLE 4: Model Estimates (Contd.)
Variables Cox PH Cox PH Disc.PH Disc.MPH
Firm £ Year Level
(Excess) size:
ln(real ¯xed capital + 1) ¡00636
(¡102)
¡00745
(¡118)
¡00921
(¡165)
+ ¡02940
(¡262)
¤¤
(Excess) Cash °ow to Capital ¡12314
(¡1462)
¤¤ ¡12199
(¡1460)
¤¤ ¡12964
(¡1800)
¤¤ ¡30536
(¡1225)
¤¤
(Excess) Gross Margin 01273
(096)
00960
(073)
00218
(018)
¡03154
(¡117)
(Excess) Gearing 00123
(002)
¡00963
(¡015)
¡01996
(¡029)
38479
(273)
¤¤
Macroeconomy
Year dummies YES NO NO NO
Business Cycle ¡ ¡01396
(¡147)
¡00852
(¡094)
¡00160
(¡066)
Real interest rate ¡ ¡00967
(¡077)
¡00254
(¡021)
00754
(051)
Interest rate instability
£ I(age 0-3 years) ¡ 19307
(288)
¤¤ 18567
(219)
¤ 22377
(196)
¤
£ I(age  3 years) ¡ 04226
(083)
01963
(040)
¡02711
(¡046)
Exchange rate instability ¡ 06227
(059)
¡09044
(¡095)
11011
(081)
US Business Cycle
£ I(age 0-3 years) ¡ 04378
(066)
04137
(063)
¡08332
(¡106)
£ I(age  3 years) ¡ 01100
(115)
01057
(113)
00026
(002)
No. of ¯rms (No. in distress) 1 609(289) 1 609(289) 1 609(289) 1 609(289)
Total time at risk (¯rm-yrs) 8 039 8 039 8 039 8 039
Log-likelihood ¡1168425 ¡1172669 ¡843822 ¡764253
LRT { Joint signi¯cance of
industry dummies (d.f. / -value) 160448 160000¤¤ 160008¤¤ 160202
LRT { Joint signi¯cance of macro.
variables (d.f./-value) 90005¤¤ 70033¤ 70061+ 70371
The Grambsch and Therneau (1994) test fails to reject the proportional
hazards assumption for both models. However, the Bhattacharjee (2008) test
rejects proportionality against monotone nonproportional covariate e®ects for
two variables: interest rate instability and the US business cycle. Therefore,
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we allow these covariates to have potentially age varying e®ects, using the
histogram sieve estimator of Murphy and Sen (1991).
We also estimate a model with shared frailty, where ¯rms incorporated in
the same year are clustered a priori to have the same draw of a Gamma dis-
tributed random e®ect. Estimates are similar, but evidence for unobserved
heterogeneity in macroeconomic founding conditions is not signi¯cant. Nev-
ertheless, we suspect a potential role for unobserved heterogeneity at the ¯rm
level, possibly related to unobserved entrepreneurial human capital, initial
e±ciency level, or other endowments (Bhattacharjee et al., 2006).
Further, since our duration data are recorded in annual frequency, the
data generating process is better modeled as a grouped duration data pro-
portional hazards model, or discrete PH model. As discussed above, we
incorporate an useful variation and allow the baseline hazard function to
vary over the lifetime of the ¯rm.21 Model estimates, presented in the third
set of results in Table 4 are similar to the continuous time Cox PH model.
Finally, we estimate the model in discrete time, after accounting for un-
observed heterogeneity at the individual ¯rm level. Estimates with Gamma
distributed heterogeneity allowing for nonproportional covariate e®ects are
presented in the ¯nal set of results in Table 4.22 The null hypothesis of \no
unobserved heterogeneity" is rejected at the 1 percent level. While the esti-
mates are similar to the previous models in signs of the coe±cients, magni-
tude and signi¯cance of the covariate e®ects are somewhat di®erent. Further,
the e®ect of interest rate instability clearly varies with age of the ¯rm.23
We check our results for robustness in several ways. First, in allowing
for unobserved heterogeneity at the ¯rm level, we verify that our ¯ndings
are robust to ignored ¯rm speci¯c factors. Second, as discussed earlier, we
21Speci¯cally, the baseline hazard function is allowed to take di®erent values over the
four age intervals: 0-3 years, 4-8 years, 9-23 years and \more than 23" years respectively.
22We also estimated a similar model with unobserved heteogeneity modeled nonpara-
metrically as a discrete mixture of degenerate distributions in a sequence with increasing
number of components; for further discussion of this methodology, see Jenkins (1995) and
van den Berg (2001). We do not ¯nd evidence of such discrete mixture frailty.
23As discussed earlier, we statistically test the hypothesis that each of the covariates
included in the analysis has proportional e®ects on the hazard rate of ¯nancial distress.
The tests proposed in Bhattacharjee (2008) used for this purpose indicate that two of
the included covariates, namely interest rate instability and the US business cycle, have
nonproportional e®ects. We therefore interact the e®ect of these two explanatory variables
with ¯rm age.
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experiment with several alternative constructions of our measure of ¯nancial
distress; the estimates are very similar, both quantitatively and qualitatively.
Third, we estimate a logit model with ¯rm level ¯xed e®ects and verify the
our ¯ndings are consistent.
Overall, our empirical results underscore the importance of allowing for
unobserved heterogeneity and nonproportional covariate e®ects.
5.1.1 Firm attributes and industry
Our ¯ndings on the impact of ¯rm level factors on the hazard rate of ¯nancial
distress fall along expected lines. Further, these e®ects are strong and robust
to the impact of ¯rm-speci¯c unobserved heterogeneity.
The hazard rate of ¯nancial distress declines signi¯cantly with size. With
gradual liberalisation of the Chinese industrial sector, goals of ¯rms have
progressively concentrated on pro¯t maximization. As a consequence, more
resources have concentrated on the large enterprises and departments, and
small SOEs and private enterprises have faced increasing ¯nancial di±cul-
ties. Concurrently, through its reform of the SOE sector, the state has also
concentrated its supportive role on the big state-owned companies.
As expected, ¯nancial distress increases with gearing; companies with
lower gearing have a more sustainable debt pro¯le and are therefore less
susceptible to ¯nancial distress. While the e®ect of pro¯tability on ¯nancial
distress is not signi¯cant, companies with higher cash °ow have lower hazard
of ¯nancial distress. This ¯nding is consistent with the idea that the ¯nancial
strength gained from a stronger cash °ow dominates potential agency costs
related to free cash °ow.
The age of ¯rms signi¯cantly a®ects ¯nancial distress in the discrete time
models. The baseline hazard rate for ¯rms over 8 years of age is signi¯cantly
higher than the youngest ¯rms below 3 years of age. This evidence is some-
what unexpected. Nevertheless, the ¯nding is not inconsistent with the active
learning model (see also Pakes and Ericson, 1998), and may re°ect special
protection o®ered to very young ¯rms, specially in strategic industries.
However, the industry ¯xed e®ects are jointly signi¯cant at the 5 percent
level only in the estimated discrete PH model without frailty. This evidence
is in line with the idea that lack of an appropriate competitive business
environment may inhibit development of strong industry e®ects.24
24Evidence from India (Bhattacharjee and Majumdar, 2007) suggests that indus-
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5.1.2 Macroeconomic conditions and instability
The annual ¯xed e®ects representing macroeconomic conditions (not reported
in Table 4) show evidence of a sharp decline over the period 1998 to 2006.
This provides evidence that the operating environment for Chinese ¯rms
has improved over time, notwithstanding signi¯cant macroeconomic °uctua-
tions. Although none of these year e®ects are individually signi¯cant at the
5 percent level, they are jointly signi¯cant at the 1 percent con¯dence level.
Since the period under study covers various stages of the business cycle, the
above evidence points to the important role of macroeconomic management
for Chinese industry.
Overall, our ¯ndings point to the impact of macroeconomic instability
on enhanced ¯nancial distress. In fact, the only prominent macroeconomic
e®ects are observed for interest rate instability. Further, this adverse e®ect
depends on the age of ¯rms since listing, being statistically signi¯cant only for
the youngest ¯rms. Young ¯rms, primarily private ¯rms, su®er from greater
credit constraints compared to state ¯rms. Even otherwise, the adverse ef-
fect of macroeconomic shocks may be greater on younger ¯rms, because of
learning and other related e®ects (Bhattacharjee et al., 2009b). This under-
scores the nonproportional e®ect of interest rate instability and justi¯es our
empirical strategy to allow for age varying covariate e®ects.
There is also limited evidence that Chinese ¯rms are likely to face higher
¯nancial distress during years when the Yuan Renminbi (RMB) appreciates
sharply. However, this e®ect is signi¯cant either when interest rate insta-
bility is not included in the model, or when high exchange rate instability
is interacted with concurrently high interest rate instability. This can be
partly explained by the link between the ¯xed exchange rate regime and
lower °exibility in interest rate setting in the Chinese macroeconomy.25
The business cycle is not signi¯cant and neither is the US business cycle,
our proxy for export demand. Similarly real interest rates also have no
signi¯cant e®ect. The general lack of signi¯cant e®ects of macroeconomic
trial reforms have enhanced the role of industry in determining inter-¯rm pro¯tability
di®erentials.
25Contrary to claims by the Chinese monetary authority of a managed °oating exchange
rate policy, the Dollar/RMB exchange rate had been stable around 827 over the 11 year
period 1994 to 2005. The constraints of ¯xed exchange rate is strongly re°ected in China's
interest rate policy over this period.
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conditions, rather than instability, on ¯nancial distress appears to underscore
relatively robust macroeconomic management. Weaker ¯rms may be o®ered
protection against adverse macroeconomic shocks, and despite the export
orientedness, it would appear that Chinese industry has been by and large
successful in ¯nding alternative export markets and thereby avoiding strong
adverse e®ects of external shocks. At the same time, state interventionism
may be negatively associated with growth and productivity (Guariglia and
Poncet, 2008).
5.1.3 Institutional in°uences
The most important institutional in°uences coming out of our results lie in
the consistent and signi¯cant e®ect of stock exchanges. In particular, as com-
pared with foreign stock exchanges, ¯rms listed in domestic exchanges have
higher distress hazard, and the e®ect is particularly high for Hong Kong
and Shenzhen exchanges. Previous research has highlighted several struc-
tural and institutional di®erences across Chinese stock exchanges; see, for
example, Mookherjee and Yu (1995). In particular, it has been noted that
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges su®er from poor legal infrastructure,
as well as ine±ciencies (Li, 2003). Our evidence appears to point towards
an important disciplining role played by stock exchanges, particularly Hong
Kong and Shanghai.
As discussed earlier, the fact that state protection for the failing ¯rm is
substantial in China. Against this backdrop, one would expect state owned
and collective ¯rms to have a lower hazard of ¯nancial distress. Somewhat
surprisingly, while there is a consistent negative e®ect, this is not statistically
signi¯cant. One explanation could be interaction with size, since most of
the SOEs are very large. Indeed, when size is not included in the model,
ownership turns out to be signi¯cant. However, this is a tentative suggestion
which requires to be examined further.
5.2 Comparison with advanced economy studies
Our study highlights several important similarities and di®erences with ad-
vanced economy studies on the determinants of ¯rm exits, defaults and dis-
tress, such as those reported in Ilmakunnas and Topi (1999) and Bhattachar-
jee et al. (2009a,b).
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First, we highlight the fact that there are indeed very few exits in Chinese
industry. This primarily points to very weak debtor protection, an institu-
tional setting that the economic model developed here ¯ts very well. A new
bankruptcy code has recently been introduced, and its impact on ensuring
appropriate and progressive legal infrastructure for reorganisation and bank-
ruptcy remains to be seen; see Falke (2007) for a discussion of the code and
its likely implications. Also, it is evident that substantial state protection is
o®ered to weak ¯rms, but also some private ¯rms. Such interventionist in-
dustrial policy appears to be e®ective, somewhat in the same way as Chapter
11 in the US partially protects ¯rms from immediate dissolution (Brouwer,
2006; Bhattacharjee et al., 2009a). However, notwithstanding limited posi-
tive in°uences, lack of disciplining in°uence of debtors, and potentially stock
markets too, is likely to encourage ine±ciency in Chinese industry; see also
Guariglia and Poncet (2008).
Second, in terms of microeconomic ¯rm-level factors, our results are very
similar to western studies, in that size, cash °ow and gearing are found to
be important determinants of ¯nancial distress.
Third, our results point to a substantially lower e®ect of industry as com-
pared to western studies such as Bhattacharjee et al. (2009a,b). This may
not be very surprising. Evidence from India (Bhattacharjee and Majumdar,
2007) points to the fact that it often takes an intensive period of industrial
reforms for western type industry structure to develop.
Fourth, and perhaps most surprisingly, we ¯nd much weaker macroeco-
nomic e®ects as compared with western studies on ¯rm exit (Ilmakunnas and
Topi, 1999; Bhattacharjee et al., 2009a,b). The main explanations rest in ac-
tive state protection of weak ¯rms and credible macroeconomic management.
In this context, particularly important is our ¯nding that the US business
cycle also has no substantial e®ect, in spite of a high dependence on exports;
this evidence is in sharp contrast with listed ¯rms in the UK (Bhattacharjee
et al., 2009a,b). It appears that Chinese industry is very e®ective in locating
demand for its exports overseas.
Finally, our observation of an increasing baseline hazard rate is somewhat
unusual, though not inconsistent with the active learning model; see Pakes
and Ericson (1998), for example. Institutional explanations can be poten-
tially found in the nature of Chinese state protection, an issue for future
study.
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5.3 Policy implications
Several important policy implications emerge from our analysis, particularly
against the context of ongoing transition in the Chinese economy.
First, interest rate instability, measured by cross-section variation in ef-
fective interest rates, have a devastating e®ect on the youngest ¯rms. As
discussed earlier, credit constraints in Chinese industry are very high (Huang
and Khanna, 2003) and presumably this a®ects the youngest ¯rms hardest.
This points to the need for development of appropriate markets. Similarly,
though relatively weaker, exchange rate instability also has some detrimental
e®ect on Chinese ¯rms. Here too, further liberalisation of foreign exchange
markets (particularly in derivatives products) may provide better opportu-
nity for Chinese ¯rms to guard against exchange rate shocks.
Second, active state protection for the failing ¯rm is likely to diminish
with the implementation of new laws and reorganisation systems (Harmer,
1996; Falke, 2007). This will potentially make Chinese ¯rms more susceptible
to macroeconomic shocks in the future. The importance of good macroeco-
nomic management will then be even more enhanced. In particular, as evi-
dent from the increasing baseline hazard rate, an important positive aspect
of the current institutional setting appears to be strong protection o®ered
to weaker (younger) ¯rms. While such state protection may reduce through
legal reform, adequate provisions need to be built into the new legislation.
Chapter 11 in the US o®ers similar protection to ¯rms while upholding debtor
rights too (Bhattacharjee et al., 2009a). The legislation and practice of Chap-
ter 11 may thus serve as an important model for Chinese bankruptcy and
reorganisation laws.
Finally, China has so far followed a rather gradualist approach to reforms
in industrial policy. Our evidence shows that the kind of industry e®ects
typical in advanced economies are yet to emerge. \Command and control"
industrial policies in many developing countries inhibit the development of
typical industry structures one ¯nds in advanced economies. Further reform
of the industry sector will possibly promote the emergence of more prominent
industry e®ects.26
26The Indian experience, studied in Bhattacharjee and Majumdar (2007), indicate that
the role of industry in determining ¯rm performance emerges a reasonable time after active
industrial policies are implemented.
30
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we examined the relationship between ¯nancial distress on
the one hand, and ¯rm-level characteristics and the macroeconomic cycle
on the other, focusing on listed Chinese companies. The period of analysis,
1995-2006, has seen massive regulatory and institutional changes in China,
and evidenced substantial variation in the business cycle and instability.
State protection in China ensures that there are only very few business exits.
Therefore, we conduct our analysis based on a synthetic measure of ¯nancial
distress. Conditioned on the above institutional setting, we develop a simple
economic model of ¯nancial distress. Using hazard regression analysis, we
¯nd important e®ects of ¯rm-level characteristics such as age of the ¯rm, size,
gearing and cash °ow. In addition, we ¯nd an important e®ect of instability
in the interest rate, as well as important institutional e®ects. The results are
robust to unobserved heterogeneity at the ¯rm level, as well as those shared
by ¯rms in similar macroeconomic founding conditions.
Our results underscore the importance of smooth macroeconomic manage-
ment in an emerging market context. Further, they o®er interesting points of
comparison with related studies in western economies, and highlight several
policy implications. In particular, the important role for developing appro-
priate markets is emphasized, and so too are reforms in industrial policy and
the rule of law.
Several lines of further research emerge from our work. First, the links
between the process of macroeconomic, industrial and legislative reforms in
China and corporate distress hypothesized in this paper need to be further
examined. Second, the ¯nding of a decreasing baseline hazard rate is unusual
in the literature. Robustness of this ¯nding needs to be studied and explana-
tions sought in the speci¯cs of industrial dynamics in China. Third, implica-
tions of our work for credit scoring, and more generally credit management
under the Basel II framework, requires further examination. Finally, while
we identify new evidence on the determinants of ¯nancial distress in Chinese
industry, similar work for other emerging market economies is required for
obtaining a more precise understanding of these issues.
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